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uncertainty allows for ex-post excess capacity and leads firms to look at the expeeted 
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1 Introduction 
In modern macroeconomic theory Tobin's q models have become the most 
frequent explanation for investment behavior. The original idea, proposed 
by Tobin (1969), says that investment depends on "average q" defined as the 
ratio of firm's value evaluated in the stock market to its replacement costo 
In the tradition of Jorgenson's (1963) neoclassical model, the introduetion oí 
adjustment costs allows for investment funetions obeying Tobin's principIe. 
Nevertheless, the investment rate depends on "marginal q", i.e., the ratio oí 
the marginal value of capital to the replacement cost, rather than on average 
q. Hayashi (1982) has given sufficient conditions, concerning technology, for 
the equality between average and marginal q. This has reopened the debate 
about the relevance of average q and the stock market valuation of the firm 
in investment decisions. 
From a theoretical point of view, the main concern is the relation be-
tween average and marginal q. One way to examine this relation is to 
analyze the investment behavior oí firms with adjustment costs in non-
Walrasian economies; this has already received sorne analysis using fixed-
price frameworks. 1 Precious (1987) shows that marginal q is smaller than 
·1 thank Ch. Arnsperger, D. de la Croix, Ph. De Villé, J. Dreze, J.P. Lambert, Pierre 
Malgrange and H. Sneessens for helpful conversations. They should not be held reponsible 
for any mistakes. Financial support of the Fonds de Développement Scientifique (FDS) of 
the Catholic University of Louvain is gratefully acknowledged. 
lSee Blanchard and Sachs (1982), Malgrange and Villa (1984), Michel (1986), and 
Precious (1987). 
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average q when the firm knows that it will face demand constraints in fu-
ture periods, even if Hayashi's (1982) assumptions hold. The difference is 
explained by the marginal value of aH future demand constraints. Empirical 
estimations have been carried out for this model by Chan-Lee and Torres 
(1987), using the degree of capacity utilization (henceforth DUC) as a proxy 
for the marginal value of aH future demand constraints. They conclude that 
DUC plays a significant role in explaining investment. The role of DUC in 
empirical investment functions is also stressed by the European Unemploy-
ment Prograrnme (EUP).2 
Another way to understand Tobin's (1969) proposition was suggested by 
Malinvaud (1987) (1989), who shifts the emphasis from adjustment costs to 
demand uncertainty. In Malinvaud 's view, the firm is essentiaHy concerned 
with forecasting future demand when it must decide about capacities. The 
fact that demand is not known with certainty implies that capacities can be 
underutilized. This leads the firm to take into account expeeted capacity 
utilization when she must decide about investment. Empirical estimation of 
Malinvaud's q model was carried out by Lambert and Mulkay (1990). 
Our main concern is to combine the adjustment cost assumption with 
Malinvaud 's proposition that demand uncertainty matters, and to show that 
both approaches are complementary. This should aHow for a more general 
result, where Malinvaud's solution holds if there are no adjustment costs on 
investment and where the neoclassical model verifies if capacities are fuHy 
employed. From an empirical point of view, we try to derive formaHy an 
investment equation depending on both average q and the degree of capacity 
utilization. 
In this paper, the investment behavior of the firm is analyzed in the tra-
dition of q investment models. Moreover, it is assumed that only demand is 
random and that aH other state variables are known by the firmo As in ra-
tioning models, conditions are imposed so that the firm's produetion is equal 
to the minimum of supply and demando To avoid the coexistence of fixed 
prices and perfeetly competitive markets, firms are assumed to be in a mo-
nopolisticaHy competitive economy and to be setting prices before knowing 
the stochastic demando When the random term materializes the firm's price 
is already set and demand becomes an upper bound on production. Nominal 
price rigidities are thus imposed in the model, being justified by the existence 
of "menu costs" or information costs as in the New Keynesian setup.3 
In addition to this nominal rigidity, firms are assumed to be facing tech-
nological rigidities: factors are complements -at least in the short run- and 
2The EUP has coordinated the estimation of an "aggregation over micro-markets in 
disequilibrium" macromodel across 10 countries. The main conclusions are presented by 
Dreze and Bean (1990). 
3See Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapter 8, for a survey oC this literature. 
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the capital stock is given at each period -investment takes one period of "time 
to build" or alternatively is subject to a one-period "delivery lag." Poten-
tial output, or capacity, is defined as the capital stock times the technical 
coefficient for capital. Since in the short run the capital stock is given and 
factor substitutability is impossible, the firm cannot produce more than total 
capacities. Potential output, like demand, is an upper bound on production. 
Since production is equal to the minimum of capacities and a stochastic 
demand, when deciding about prices and investment the firm must forecast 
future production. The stochastic demand shock is assumed multiplicative, ( 
implying that expected production is a linear homogeneous function of ex-
pected demand and capacities. In particular, if the random shock is log-
normal1y distributed, expected production can be approximated by a CES 
function of expected demand and capacities, as in Lambert (1988). The only 
fundamental difference with respect to standard investment models comes 
from expected production. In the accelerator model production is always 
determined by demand and in the neoclassical model production is never 
demand-constrained. Our model specifies expected production as a function 
of expected demand and capacities. 
( With respect to the neoclassical model, demand uncertainty changes the 
marginal effect of capital on profits. An increase in capital raises expected 
production less than marginal productivity, since the new unit of capital 
has a positive probability of nonutilization. In the neoclassical model this 
probability is equal to zero since production is never demand-constrained. 
This property can also be expresed in terms of elasticities: in our model the 
elasticity of expected production to capacities is smal1er than one. 
Hayashi (1982) shows that in the neoclassical model, with the adjustment 
cost function being linear homogeneous in capital and investment, marginal q 
is equal to average q. Under demand uncertainty and factor complementarity, 
even if the adjustment cost function is linear homogeneous in capital and 
investment, marginal q is no longer equal to average q. Marginal q is in 
fact smal1er than average q, the difference being explained by future profits 
weighted by the elasticity of expected production to expected demando This 
result is close to the one obtained in fix-price investment models, where the 
difference between marginal and average q is explained by the marginal value 
of future demand constraints. 
A simpler result is also obtained in Section 3. Since the firm is assumed 
not to produce at ful1 capacities, the degree of capacity utilization appears 
as an intuitive component of the adjustment cost function. In particular this 
function is supposed separable and increasing in DUC, implying that the 
more capacities are employed the more costly it is for the firm to implement 
newequipment. Under this assumption, marginal q is still smal1er than av-
erage q and the investment ratio can be approximated as a loglinear function 
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of average q and DUC. This result turns out to be equivalent to Hayashi's 
when DUC is unity and equivalent to Malinvaud's when marginal q is equal 
to one. 
In Section 2 the point of departure is the monopolistic competition set-
up, in the particular version of Sneessens (1987).4 We show that marginal 
and average q diverge by a multiplicative factor which depends on expecta-
tions about the degree of capacity utilization. Seetion 3 develops a discrete 
dynamic model for investment. Dnder general assumptions about the ad-
justment cost funetion, average q is shown to diverge from marginal q as a 
consequence of expected excess capacities. 
2 The Static Problem 
We start with a static model similar to that of Sneessens (1987). As we 
will show later, the most important charaeteristics of the dynamic model are 
already contained in this static version. 
2.1 Uncertainty and Irreversibility 
With a Leontief production technology and two production factors capital 
and labor, capacity constraints are 
YP = Bl( 
where YP is potential output, B is the technical coefficient for capital and 
K is the capital stock. The firm is assumed to be unconstrained in the 
labor market at the given wage rateo Demand is specified in a monopolistic 
competition framework: 
p )-f (YD)YD= ( P -;- U. 
The demand YD to the firm depends on its own price p, re1ative to the 
aggregate price level P, on aggregate demand YD and on a stochastic term 
u, which is assumed lognormal with unit mean and given variance. The 
number of firms, denoted by n, is assumed given and large enough. 
The main ideas of Malinvaud, irreversibility and demand uncertainty, líe 
behind these assumptions. Malinvaud's definition of "irreversibility" implies 
that both capital and capital intensity are fixed before the realization of the 
random demand shock. In this paper irreversibility takes the particular form 
4Malinvaud (1987) also studies the behavior of a monopolistic firmo Investrnent deci-
sions in monopolistic competition are analyzed by Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) 
in the Tobin's q tradition. 
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of a Leontief production function, with the capital stock decided upon before 
the stochastic term is known. 
The model imposes a specific sequence in the decision process. Investment 
and prices are decided before the stochastic term is known. But production 
and labor demand are determined after its realization. This implies, in ad-
dition to the Leontief produetion funetion hypothesis, that produetion will 
be the minimum of supply and demando The assumption that the firm fixes 
its price before knowing the stochastic demand term is a sufficient condition 
for non-market-clearing.5 In addition, if capacities are scarce, demand will 
be rationed. Moreover, the model assumes that consumers facing a demand 
constraint in a market do not modify their demands on other markets.6 
2.2 Expected Production 
Under these assumptions, production is equal to the minimum of demand 
and potential output. Since u is lognormally distributed with unit mean, the 
expected value of production can be written as7 
where 
E(YD) = (~) -€ (Y:) . 
In this expression p depends on the variance of the demand shock. The 
minimum condition is the limit case when p -+ oo. Figure 1 represents 
the relation between price and expeeted values when expeeted produetion is 
represented by a CES function. 
Lambert (1988) puts forward the CES funetion as a representation of 
aggregate produetion when, at the micro-Ievel, markets are in disequilibrium. 
In his book, the stochastic terms describe the distribution of the constraints 
across the micromarkets. Sneessens uses Lambert's result to analyze the 
behavior of a representative firmo While the CES is a particular expression 
for E(Y) under the assumption of a lognormal distribution, its merit is to 
allow for explicit results.8 
One important charaeteristic of the CES funetion is that the probability 
of being in a particular regime, i.e., that a particular constraint prevails, has 
5 As in Akerlof and Yellen (1985) Mankiw (1985) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), 
it can be justified by the existence of "menu costs" . 
6Benassy (1990) provides the appropriate set-up to build the objective demand function 
faced by monopolistic firms when such spillover effects are allowed. 
7For a proof of the CES representation of the expected value of production, see Lambert 
(1988). 
8For a discussion of the implications of lognormality, see Lambert (1988). 
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a simple expression. For example, the weighted probability that potential 
output will be the main constraint in the determination of production is 
e Prw (YP < VD) = iI>p = ( E(Y))PYP 
e 
Moreover, the elasticity of expected production with respect to a given con-
straint is equal to the weighted probability of that constraint. In particu-
lar, the elasticity of expected production with respect to potential output is 
equal to iI>p. Because iI>p becomes too small when YP becomes very large, 
the positive effect of potential output on expected production is decreasing 
and always smal1er than one. 
e 2.3 The Optimal Problem and the Adjustment Cost 
Function 
In an uncertain world, and under the previous assumptions, the monopolistic 
competitive firm's optimization problem can be written as 
e v = Max E (pY -
a,p 
wL - PO(a)I{"J 
subjed io 
y = 
YD = 
min {VD, YP} 
(~) -~ (Y~) u 
YP = Bl< 
( l< = f{"(l + a), 
e 
e 
where w is the wage rate, L is employment, f{" is the initial capital stock 
before investment is decided and a is the investment rate, that is, investment 
divided by the initial capital stock. The price of investment goods is assumed 
equal to the aggregate price level. Total investment costs are represented by 
PO(a)[{". The 0(.) function is increasing and convex, and verifies 0(0) = O 
and 0'(0) = 1. 
Because it is assumed that labor demand is determined after the realiza-
tion of the stochastic terms, optimal1y L = A-1Y, where A is the Leontief 
coefficient for labor. Thus 
pY - wL = (p - MLC)Y, 
where MLC = wA-1 is the marginal labor costo 
e 
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Figure 1: The CES representation oí Expected Production 
( 
In addition, as long as P, w, A, B, YD and n are assumed to be known 
by the firm, we can write the optimization problem as 
e 
v = Max {(p - MLC)E(Y) - PO(a)l{*} (1) 
a,p 
subjeet io 
/ 
\ E (Y) = [E (YDY +ypprr; 1 
E (YD) = (~)-~ (Y~) 
YP = Bl{ 
l{ = l{* (1 +a) . 
2.4 Optimal Investment and Prices 
The first-order conditions íor this problem are 
8V = ( _ MLC) 8E (Y) E (Y) = O (2)8p P 8p + , 
8V = (p _ MLC) 8E (Y) _ PO' (a) l{* = O. (3)8a 8a 
The derivatives oí E (Y) with respect to p and a are 
8E (Y) _ 8E (Y) 8E (YD) _ <I> E (Y) 8E (YD) (4)8p - 8E (YD) 8p - k E (YD) 8p 
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where ~k = ( E (YD) , 
and 
e oE (Y) = oE (Y) oYP = €J> E (Y) fe (5) 
oa oYP oa P K 
where ~P = (EJJ)) P 
The ratio of E (Y) to YP is the expected degree of capacity utilization 
E (DUC). We must always remember that the elasticities €J>p and ~k repre-
sent expected values. 
Condition (2), together with the derivative (4), implies the well-known 
condition for a monopoly:9 
e (6) 
where r¡ = f€J>k. 
As shown by Sneessens, the price elasticity r¡ of expected production depends 
on the price elasticity f multiplied by the weighted probability €J>k of excess e 
demando 
If we take (3) and (5), the first-order condition for investment becomes 
'( ) = A> (p - MLC)E(Y)n a..,p PI< . (7) 
e 
Let us assume that each unit of real capital is financed by one share and 
define average q, denoted by Q, as 
= (p - MLC)E (Y)Q (8)PI< .e 
Then the marginal condition (7) becomes 
(9) 
e The main characteristic of this solution is that average q diverges írom 
marginal q by a multiplicative factor: the weighted probability ~p oí a ca-
pacity constraint. This result can be interpreted as follows. If capacities are 
larger than demand, the marginal value oí capital is zero. But if there is 
excess demand, as long as the production íunction is linearly homogeneous, 
'c the marginal value of capital is equal to the average value. When there is 
9This result is in the tradition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The main difference is that 
the price elasticity of production depends on the probability 4>k. The firms are supposed 
identical up to product differentiation, so that individual prices are equal to the aggregate 
price level for aH firms. 
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demand uncertainty, the marginal value of investment is equal to the average 
value weighted by the probability <I>p of a capacity constraint. 
Implicit in the price equation (6) and in the investment equation (9) is 
the steady state value for expected DUe, which is the solution of 
E (Duey+I f (10)1- E (Duey+I - B· 
It can be easily verified that there is a unique positive solution for expected 
DUe, which is strictly smaller than one for finite values of f and p. It 
suggests that the firm optimally expects to partial1y employ its capacities. 
Nevertheless, when f goes to infinity prices tend to the perfect competitive 
ones and capacities become fully employed. 
2.5 Example 
It is interesting to look at the particular case where 
n' (a) = exp {a +ba} , 
which satisfies the conditions imposed on n (a) when b> o. The optimality 
condition for investment (9) becomes 
(ll) 
Figure 2 shows the relation between the investment rate a and average 
q, for values of expected DUe between 1 and .70, with a = o. The larger 
the excess capacity, the lower the level of investment associated with a given 
value of Q. In particular, since expected DUe is smaller than 1, a unit Q is no 
longer associated with zero investment, but rather with negative investment. 
In other words, zero investment requires a Q aboye unity if expected DUe 
is smal1er than one. lO 
The specification of the investment function in equation (11) is very sim-
ilar to that estimated by Chan-Lee and Torres (1987). Looking at the dise-
quilibrium investment models proposed by Malgrange and Villa (1984) and 
Michel (1986), these authors specify investment as a function of average q 
adjusted for the degree of capacity utilization, relying on the theoretical ar-
gument that the degree of capacity utilization is correlated with the demand 
constraint. In our framework, DUe appears not as an instrumental variable 
for the marginal value of demand constraints, but rather as an approximation 
lOEquation (11) is drawn without taking into account that changes in ex modify expected 
DUC and Q, for given values of the exogenous variables. The solution for ex and p must 
be obtained fram equation (6) and (7) using the definitions of <I>p, <I> k and E(Y). 
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of the weighted probability of a capacity constraint. In this sense this paper 
can be seen as providing a theoretical foundation for this type of empirical 
approach to investment. 
e 
Investment 
( 
1 .... .. .... 
.. .. Averageq 
.. .... ...... E(DUC) = .70 
" ..
" " e 
" " ,," " ~ 
Figure 2: Investment and Tobin's q 
e 
3 The Dynamic Model 
The static version of the model presented in the previous section enables us 
to link investment to both average q and the degree of capacity utilization 
in a very simple way. We shall now analyze a dynarnic problem and look for 
conditions that reproduce the static resulto 
Let us start by taking a more general functional form for the investment 
cost function. Since the firm is assumed not necessarily to produce at full 
capacity, the degree of capacity utilization appears as an intuitive component 
of the adjustment cost functionj total investment costs are thus defined as 
'lJ(I, K, DUC). For simplicity, we assume that the function 'lJ(.) is separable 
in DUC and linearly homogeneous in capital and investment, Le., it can be 
written as 
'lJ(I, K, DUC) = n(~ ) K r(DUC), (12) 
where the r(.) and n(.) are increasing and convex functions. This implies 
that, for given values of 1 and K, investment costs rise with capacity utiliza-
tion. It is as if the nearer the firm is to the full utilization rate, the more 
difficulties it faces in devoting resources to new projects. Conversely, under-
employed resources can be devoted to install new equipment, lowering the 
installation costs. 
10 
( 
e 
It is instructive to distinguish inside W between adjustment costs and 
purchasing costs. We thus decompose total investment costs into 
(13)
e 
where pI represents the price of investment goods and the second term on 
the right-hand side represents adjustment costs. According with the normal-
ization assumptions proposed in the previous section for the 0(.) funetion, 
f(DUC) must be at least equal to one to ensure that adjustment costs are 
e everywhere non-negative. 
3.1 Optimization Problem and Optimality Conditions 
The stochastic demand term is assumed i.i.d. and 10gnormaHy distributed. 
( 
\. AH other exogenous variables are assumed known by the firmo Under the 
previous assumptions the optimization problem for the firm can be written 
as11 
( vt = Max ~ [(Ps - MLCs)Et(Ya) - p~O(:~J I<a-lEt(f(DUCs))] 
{O:s,Ps} 
(1 +rt(s-t) (14) 
subjeet to 
(15) 
(16)e 
(17) 
with given initial value I<t-l. vt is the firm's value. The discount rate r, the 
demand elasticity f the depreciation rate Ó and the parameter pare assumede 
constant. The paths of the exogenous variables P, MLC, pI and B are taken 
as known by the firmo Time-t investment and prices are decided at period 
t-1, so that E t are expectations taken with respeet to the information set at 
t-1 (note that this information set does not contain the stochastic demand 
( shock ud. 
llThe non-autocorrelation assumption on the stochastic terms allows for a non-
stochastic path in the control variable, which implies that profits are a linear function 
of two random variables, production and the r function. 
e 
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The Lagrangean for this problem is 
00 
- LJls (Ks - ls - (1 - h)Ks-t) (1 + rt(s-t), 
s=t 
where Jl represents the marginal value of capital. The first-order conditions 
are( 
OLt = E (~) +( _ MLC )oEt(yt) _ T/ oEt(rt)In 
J:l t t Pt t J:l Pt H t.ll.t-1 J:l (18)UPt UPt UPt 
OLt 1 , ( )
olt = -PtntEt r t + Jlt = O, (19) 
e OLt (20)oK = O. 
t 
The optimality condition for prices can be reduced to 
( Pt = (1- (€~k.tr1)-1 (MLCt +p:e~(~;)) , (21) 
where et is the elasticity of Et(rt ) with respect to Et(DUCt). In the particular 
case of e= 1, the price condition becomes 
_1)-1 ( p:nd{t)Pt = (1 - (€~k.t) MLCt + YP . (22)
t 
As is standard in monopoly theory, the firm fixes a markup rate over marginal 
costs. As in the static model, the demand elasticity € is multiplied by the 
probability ~k oí a demand constraint. This product represents the price 
elasticity oí expected production. However, the firm now also considers in-
vestment spending (in addition to labor costs) in the determination oí total 
marginal costo Because the investment cost function depends negatively on 
demand, the firm knows that aH modifications in its price must have an effect 
on profits through the costs of investment. If the price rises, expectations 
about demand, produetion and capacity utilization are revised downwards. 
The reduetion in expected DUC decreases the instaHation costs. Thus firms 
are induced to set a higher price than in the standard monopolistic case, 
where the II!(.) function is independent of DUC and the markup is applied 
only to marginal labor costs. 
Condition (19) aHows for a first charaeterization of the optimality condi-
tion for investment: 
(23) 
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Just as in the neoclassical investment model, optimal investment is a funetion 
of marginal q, which is represented by the ratio of the marginal value of 
capital to the replacement costo The identity of this result with Hayashi's 
depends on the specification of the investment cost funetion; if r(DUC) is 
e equal to one, equation (23) is equivalent to Hayashi's resulto 
The Euler condition for capital can be derived from equations (19) and 
(20). Solving it recursively forward we obtain 
00 
e p:Ktn~Et(rt) = ¿ (Ps - MLCs)Et(Y'a)q,p,s (1 + rr(s-t) (24) 
s=t+l 
00 
- ¿ p~Et(\l1s) (1- q,k,ses) (1 +rr(s-t). 
s=t+l 
This intermediate result will be necessary below to compare marginal q and( 
average q. In equation (24), on the left-hand side, the marginal cost of 
investment is multiplied by the capital stock. It differs from the standard 
condition because adjustment costs depend on expeeted DUC, which is not 
necessarily equal to one. On the right-hand side, we have the marginal value 
( of total capital. In the particular case where the firm expeets to fuHy use 
its capacities, equation (24) reduces to the standard condition. But it is 
an extreme case in which capacities for aH future periods are so smaH or 
expeeted demand is so large that the probability of excess capacity is zero. 
3.2 Average Q and Marginal Q 
Let us define average q as 
(25) 
Dividing both sides of equation (24) by pfKt , using the optimality condition 
(23) and the definition of average q, we can deduce a general relation between 
marginal and average q 
where 
A 00 1rs(1 + rt(S-t-l) 
q,p t = ¿ q,p s () (27) 
, s=t+l' Et Vi+l 
1rs represents time-s profits, as in equation (14). Note that in each period s, 
the elasticity q,p is weighted by time-s profits divided by the expeeted value 
of the firmo This weight ha.s the property of a probability mea.sure, since the 
13 
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value of the firm is the sum of all future profits. Thus <Í>p is a mean value 
of all future elasticities of expected production to capacities and it will be 
called the "mean potential output elasticity." 
Equation (26) represents the relation between marginal and average q 
without any particular assumption about the fO function. In this general 
case the solution of the simple dynamic problem is augmented by a new term 
which depends on investment costs weighted by <I>k(1 - e). This will become 
clearer in the next section. 
( 
3.3 Hayashi's Investment Cost Function Hypothesis 
Hayashi (1982) shows that, together with the linear homogeneity condition 
for the production function, the linear homogeneity of the investment cost 
function with respect to investment and capital is a sufficient condition for 
the equality between marginal q and average q. In our model this proposition 
no longer holds. Following Hayashi, assume that f(DUC) = 1, V DUC. In 
this case the eelasticity will be zero and it can be easily verified that 
( (28) 
Since new equipments can be partially utilized, marginal q is smaller than 
average q. The difference is represented by the second term on the right-hand 
side, where the value of expected production is weighted by the probability 
<I>k of an excess demando In a certainty model, when demand is known by the 
firm, the difference between marginal and average q depends on the marginal 
value of the future demand constraints. As shown by Precious (1987), under 
certainty we would have 
where A is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the demand constraint. 
The marginal value A of the certain demand constraint in this equation is 
equivalent to the marginal value the expected demand constraint <I>k(p -
MLC) obtained in (28). 
Finally, assume that fO is linear, or it can be linearized in such a way 
that eis equal to unity, so that the second term in the right-hand side of 
equation (26) vanishes. This implies a simple relation between marginal and 
average q 
(29) 
Under these conditions the solution for the dynamic model is very similar to 
the solution for the static mode1: average q is multiplied by a mean value of 
14 
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future potential output e1asticities. When expectations about 4)p are identical 
for all future periods, the re1ation between marginal and average q is the same 
as in the myopic static problem. 
e 
4 Conclusions 
The important role of capital constraints in macroeconomic fiuctuations was 
explained by disequilibrium models in the seventies. In this paper, we point 
( to the role of capacity constraints in explaining investment in an economy 
with monopolistic competition. In such a context, capacity constraints do 
not depend on an assumption of exogenously fixed prices since firms them-
selves set prices in an optimal way. The static model developed in Section 2 
enables us to produce a very simple investment function, in which marginal q 
( diverges from average q by the weighted probability of a capacity constraint 
(or the elasticity of expected production to capacities). The crucial assump-
tions for this result are irreversibility in the sense of Malinvaud (1987) and 
demand uncertainty. The irreversibility assumption implies that capacities 
are decided before the realization of the stochastic demando When technol-( 
ogy is defined in such a way, excess capacity is possible and firms must look 
at the expected excess capacity when deciding about investment. When the 
stochastic demand shock is given a lognormal specification, as in Sneessens 
(1987), the weighted probability of a capacity constraint is a power function 
of the expected degree of capacity utilization (DUC). The merit of lognor-
mality is to allow for explicit results, i.e., the rate of investment depends on 
average q and expeeted DUC. 
In Seetion 3 a dynamic investment problem is solved. It is shown that 
marginal and average q diverge by a mean value of all future probabilities 
of a capacity constraint. To obtain this result, a more general condition 
is imposed: adjustment costs are assumed to depend positively on DUC in 
addition to capital and investment. This assumption does not comply with 
Hayashi's (1982) linear homogeneity hypothesis. Moreover, it presumes that 
the closer the firm is to its full utilization rate, the larger are the costs as-
sociated with investment, refiecting the fact that the firm is less and less 
able to devote resources to new projects. Finally, because prices affect ex-
peeted DUC, the firm charges a markup rate over marginal investment costs 
in addition to marginal labor costs. 
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Appendix 
FuB Derivation Equation (24) 
( The first-order condition (20) can be written as 
8.ct 8Et(Yí+¡) 1 [ , It+I]8I<t = (Pt+I - MLCt+I) 8I<t - Pt+I nt+I - n t+I I<t Et(ft+I) 
1 8Et(ft+¡)
-Pt+I nt+II<t 8I<t - ¡.tt(1 + r) + (1 - h)¡.tt+I = O. 
( 
The partial derivative oí E(f) with respect to I< is 
8Et(ft+I) _ t Et(ft+I) 8Et(DUCt+I) 
-l"t+I8I<t Et(DUCt+I) 8I<t 
e and 
8Et(DUCt+¡) _ 8Et(DUCt+¡) B __~ Et(DUCt+¡) 
8I<t - 8YPt+I t - k,t+I I<t ' 
where eis the elasticity oí E(f) with respect to E(DUC) and ~k is the 
elasticity oí E(Y) with respect to E(YD), which verifies ~k + ~p = 1. Using( 
that ~p is the elasticity oí E(Y) with respect to YP, substituting ¡.t by its 
expression in equation (19) and multiplying both sides by I<t, the optimality 
condition íor capital becomes 
p:I<tn~Et(ft) = (Pt+I - MLCt+I)Et(Yí+I)~p,t+I(1 +rtI 
P:+I Et (\l!t+I)(1 - ~k,t+Iet+¡)(1 +rtI 
+p:+II<t+In~+IEt(ft+I)(1 + r)-I. 
Solving this equation recursively íorward we obtain equation (24) 
p:I<tn~Et(ft) = I:00 (Ps - MLCs)Et(Ya)~p,s (1 + rr(s-t) (24) 
s=t+I 
- I:00 p~Et(\l!s) (1 - ~k,ses) (1 + rr(s-t) .QED 
s=t+I 
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